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Asset price bubbles: Implications for monetary, regulatory,
and international policies
by Darrin R. Halcomb, associate economist, and Syed Shah Saeed Hussain, associate economist
A recent conference cosponsored by the World Bank and the Chicago Fed brought
financial industry experts together to discuss the phenomenon of asset price bubbles,
which many identify as a feature of the U.S. stock market in the late 1990s. Participants
analyzed the difficulties in identifying asset bubbles and explored ways that central
banks and other monetary authorities might help ease their effects.
Many view recent activity on Wall Street
as representing the bursting of the “great
stock bubble of the 1990s.” However,
how do we really know whether we have
experienced or are experiencing a bub-
ble? Since the definition of a bubble,
generally a period in which securities
trade at prices not justified by fundamen-
tals such as earnings, is not precise in
economics or finance, experts offer dif-
ferent answers to this question. Given the
difficulties in determining the bubble’s
presence after the fact, the identifica-
tion problem is even more difficult dur-
ing the bubble’s formation. However, this
identification is very important. Among
other things, the existence of such a
bubble could require central banks and
financial authorities to alter their mon-
etary and banking policies. The World
Bank Group and the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago sponsored a confer-
ence, “Asset Price Bubbles: Implications
for Monetary, Regulatory, and Interna-
tional Policies,” held at the Chicago Fed
on April 22–24, 2002, to address these
issues. Leading academics, policymak-
ers, and practitioners from throughout
the world gathered to present current
work on this subject. This Chicago Fed
Letter summarizes the discussions and
conclusions from this conference.1
The keynote speaker on the opening
night, Randall Kroszner, member of the
President’s Council of Economic Ad-
visers, discussed the information diffi-
culties inherent in the identification of
bubbles. “The research record on asset
price measurement is far from being
sufficient to build a policymaker’s con-
fidence,” said Kroszner. He pointed to
various inconsistencies in financial his-
tory for periods in which the Standard &
Poor’s 500 rose rapidly. For example,
the peak in 1956 was not followed by a
precipitous decline, while those in 1929
and 1937 were. Even some purported
bubble periods of the past are still in
question, making real-time identifica-
tion of bubbles even more difficult.
One thing that financial authorities can
do to better identify and prevent bubbles
is to improve the public’s access to ac-
curate information. To make a judgment
about the appropriate price for a partic-
ular stock, an investor must have solid
information about the firm’s fundamen-
tals. The access to this information must
be public and widespread. “When a price
seems to outstrip fundamentals, an in-
vestor logically asks whether it is a bub-
ble or whether he or she does not have
access to important information about
fundamentals,” said Kroszner. He
One thing that financial
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identify and prevent bubbles
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information.participation in the markets, and improve
and diversify the risk-management tools
currently used by financial institutions.
If a bubble has indeed occurred, and sub-
sequently burst, the likely result would
be a crash in the stock market. In addi-
tion, if sufficiently large, the crash should
bring about severe financial instability,
since firms’ balance sheets will be left
in a delicate state. This will result in an
increase in adverse selection and mor-
al hazard, and the premium on low- ver-
sus high-quality bonds will rise. Frederic
Mishkin, Columbia University, and
Eugene White, Rutgers University, looked
at stock market crashes in the U.S. over
the last 100 years. They compared crash-
es that led to no significant financial in-
stability with those that caused severe
financial system distress. Most crashes did
not lead to overall financial instability;
in these situations, it is best for the mon-
etary authority to react to key macro-
economic variables, not the crash. In
fact, if the focus is on the stability of the
financial system as opposed to the stock
market, the policy response by central
banks is more likely to be effective.
The experience with bubbles in Asia
and Latin America suggests that finan-
cial authorities can do more to prevent
bubbles from spiraling out of control
and allow for “soft landings.” Kunio
Okina and Shigenori Shiratsuka, from
the Bank of Japan, analyzed the asset
price bubble that developed in Japan
in the mid-1980s and burst in 1990, from
which the market has yet to fully recov-
er. Their research suggests that an ag-
gressive monetary easing should have
occurred upon the collapse of the bub-
ble, but the weakness of Japan’s bank-
based financial system prevented the
Bank of Japan from making the appro-
priate policy judgment. Many other East
Asian countries experienced bubbles in
the 1990s, but with different outcomes.
Charles Collyns and Abdelhak Senhadji,
from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), presented research showing
that countries with strong bank regula-
tory systems, such as Hong Kong,
Malaysia, and Singapore, weathered the
asset price downfalls with less disrup-
tion. Latin American countries have
also experienced bubbles in the last 20
years. Stock price movements were high-
ly correlated across Latin American
countries in the 1990s, suggesting that
bubbles can be “contagious” and are
strongly influenced by external factors,
according to Santiago Herrera and
Guillermo Perry of the World Bank.
The most important determinant of the
existence of a bubble in each of the
largest Latin American economies has
been the spread between ten-year U.S.
Treasury bonds and three-month U.S.
Treasury bills. These small open econ-
omies may need to better manage their
terms of trade and capital flows to re-
duce the likelihood of future bubbles.
Irrational or rational bubbles?
There were many dissenting viewpoints
about the existence, now or in the past,
of irrational asset price bubbles. John
Cochrane of the University of Chicago
shared his theory that the recent high
demand for tech stocks, despite their
prices being well above fundamentals,
represented something similar to a de-
mand for cash as opposed to irrational
beliefs about the future stock prices. Just
as people hold paper money for short
periods of time because of its usefulness
in making transactions, people would
buy shares of, say, Palm in order to make
future transactions with it. Because of
the inability to short sell costlessly, bet-
ting one way or the other on the future
of the company requires owning shares
of its stock. Palm’s shares outstanding
were very limited, giving it this “conve-
nience yield.” Once the amount of shares
outstanding increased significantly, the
transaction value diminished, causing
the share price to fall. The very high
turnover in shares of Palm and other
tech stocks supports this theory. Ellen
McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
offered evidence that, prior to the stock
market crash of 1929, there was no bub-
ble; in fact, stocks were undervalued
based on their calculations of the fun-
damental values of U.S. corporations
at the time. The subsequent crash was
caused by severe tightening by the
Fed, not the bursting of a bubble.
Allan Meltzer, Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity, gave a keynote lunch address
on rational and irrational bubbles.
supports recent efforts by the Bush ad-
ministration to increase and improve this
information, including the President’s
ten-point plan to improve financial dis-
closure and enhance shareholder pro-
tection and a proposal to reform 401(k)
retirement account rules to expand
the availability of investment advice.
The Governor of the Bank of France,
Jean-Claude Trichet, opened the first
morning of the conference with a cen-
tral banker’s perspective. Trichet offered
a cautious stance on the decision of
whether asset prices should be an input
or target of monetary policy. While ac-
knowledging the serious cause for con-
cern that asset price developments can
generate, he argued that the difficulties
in determining the existence of a bubble
could cause a policy targeting or in-
cluding asset prices to do more harm
than good. Determining the existence
of a bubble requires knowledge of what
the “true” asset prices should be. While
this may be relatively easy to determine
theoretically, it is impossible in practice.
Also, if central banks took the position
of always counteracting the deflation of
a bubble, agents may see stock invest-
ment as relatively riskless, and equity
markets would be exposed to moral haz-
ard. “Agents may become involved in
riskier projects without having conscious-
ly taken the decision to accept greater
risk,” Trichet stated.
Trichet identified a role for the central
bank and financial authorities in promot-
ing diverse behavior on the part of inves-
tors. A short-term outlook seems to have
presided over the markets, reinforced by
the focus on stock index performance,
with herd behavior being the result. Con-
trarian viewpoints are lacking. According
to Trichet, “More and more participants
are able to access financial markets di-
rectly, while the expertise to deal with
a larger set of technical information is
not evenly distributed. … [These] factors
… encourage homogenous behavior and
reactions to the detriment of the diver-
sity that is indispensable to the smooth
functioning of financial markets.” Trichet
proposed that we continue efforts to in-
crease market transparency, adjust ac-
counting standards and practices to
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Meltzer argued that “‘bubble’ is a name
that we assign to events that we cannot
explain with standard hypotheses.” For
most of the bubble episodes referred
to by others, Meltzer offered alterna-
tive explanations, usually involving ei-
ther overly expansionary monetary
policy (followed by an abrupt contrac-
tion) or rational expectations of pro-
ductivity increases. In all cases, the
actions of buyers and sellers in the eq-
uity markets have been rational, if not
always without error as seen in hindsight.
The recent experiences with rapid asset
price declines, according to Meltzer,
“suggest that expansive economic poli-
cies can compensate for any deflation-
ary impulse on output prices coming
from asset prices.”
Others, however, feel that the bubble
phenomenon is very real. Werner De
Bondt, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
talked about bubble psychology and ex-
plained the contributions of behavioral
finance. Though economic fundamen-
tals may dominate in the long run, hu-
man psychology is important in the short
run. He detailed a long list of individual
anomalies in finance: overconfidence,
over-reliance on the familiar, lack of di-
versification, chasing winners, and over-
trading. Forecasts by security analysts,
he showed, are too optimistic, too ex-
treme, and unprofitable; these are re-
sults consistent with cognitive bias.
Michael Bordo, Rutgers University, and
Antu Murshid, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, presented research on the
cross-country transmission of shocks in
financial markets. They examined two
periods, 1880–1913 and 1975–2000,
which share a similar extent of financial
globalization and incidence of currency
crises. In the earlier period, the world-
wide comovement was stronger; howev-
er, in the later period the comovement
was stronger within regions than world-
wide. Today, the financial crises seem to
be contained to the emerging markets.
Franklin Allen, University of Pennsylvania,
and Douglas Gale, New York Universi-
ty, find that international stock market
interlinkages can either reduce or ex-
acerbate the extent of asset price bub-
bles, depending on the amount of
credit that is provided for speculative
investment. Opening up a market to
foreign investment can expand the vol-
ume of credit and create uncertainty
about the amount of credit in the future,
leading to a potential bubble in asset
prices. Greater reliance on foreign own-
ership of banks and the use of foreign
markets for diversity in deposit and loan
sources can help insulate a country from
a bubble crisis, according to Gerard
Caprio, Jr. and Patrick Honohan of
the World Bank.
Next, Robert Shiller, Yale University, ex-
panded on the theme and framework of
his recent book, Irrational Exuberance.2
Shiller argued that there was clearly a
bubble operating in the 1990s. To ex-
plain this, he borrows the tools of oth-
er social sciences, allowing him to go
beyond the explanatory power of the
rational expectations paradigm so often
used in economics. “There are in fact
many intellectual traditions that I find
relevant to understanding asset price
bubbles,” said Shiller. He provided a
number of precipitating, amplifying,
and mediating factors for the existence
of a bubble. The advent of the World
Wide Web was one of the larger precip-
itating factors. The amplification me-
chanics, causing price increases to beget
further price increases, work as a “nat-
urally occurring Ponzi scheme,” accord-
ing to Shiller. Investor overconfidence
also contributes to this. Shiller report-
ed the results of a survey that showed
that 90% of investors thought that the
stock market would go up over the sub-
sequent year at the height of the bub-
ble. Also, previous historical stock market
peaks, such as in 1901, 1929, 1966, and
the 1990s, have been associated with
“new economy” stories.
In order for there to be a bubble, stocks
must trade at prices much higher than
suggested by their fundamentals. For
so-called new economy firms, which
may be able to utilize large productivity
gains from the Internet and other new
technologies, how should these funda-
mentals be measured? Steven Kaplan,
University of Chicago, explained that
many technology companies had such
high valuations because analysts believed
that they would deliver large reductions
in transaction costs. The valuations fell
as people realized that this might not
occur. This is consistent with rational,
if wildly off-target, behavior on the part
of market participants.
Marvin Goodfriend, Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, argued forcefully
against the idea that monetary policy
should react to asset prices. First, he said,
there is no theoretical basis for it. Both
monetary policy and asset prices are en-
dogenous variables that react to shocks
in the system. If the central bank acts
preemptively against inflation, there is
little reason to believe that monetary
policy should influence asset prices. His
research also shows that the targeting of
asset prices in Japan in the late 1980s,
or the U.S. in the late 1990s, would not
have improved monetary policy. Dis-
cussant Benjamin Friedman, Harvard
University, agreed, adding that target-
ing of asset prices can cause a danger-
ous feedback loop, in which asset prices
react to what market participants think
the central bank will do.
Others, however, believe that, since as-
set prices do stray from their fundamen-
tal values, the existence of bubbles
should be included in the formation
of monetary policy. Michael Mussa,
Institute for International Economics,
in a keynote speech, argued that, “cen-
tral bankers and other policymakers
should not be ideologues on this issue.
They should keep their ears open and be
prepared to act appropriately.” In theboom of 1999, asset prices were having
macroeconomic effects despite the slow
pace of inflation. “Strong growth of con-
sumption spending, despite an already
low personal savings rate, suggests that
high equity values were having an impor-
tant impact on aggregate demand,” ac-
cording to Mussa. Any move at this stage
by the central bank could be unpopular;
however, Mussa suggested that they
should emphasize the macroeconomic
stabilization benefits of such a move.
Stephen Cecchetti, Ohio State Univer-
sity, Hans Genberg, Graduate Institute
of International Studies in Geneva, and
Sushil Wadhwani, Bank of England, ar-
gued that a central bank might improve
its macroeconomic performance by con-
sidering asset price bubbles beyond the
effect they have on forecasts of inflation,
which are already used in policy forma-
tion. They said that central bankers
might be in a better position to react to
bubbles over the long term than market
participants. Also, inflation forecasts
may lack relevant information needed
for monetary policy formation that is
contained in asset prices.
There may also be a role for financial
regulators, as opposed to central bank-
ers, in ameliorating or preventing the
impact of asset price bubbles. Charles
Goodhart, London School of Economics,
described recent patterns of business
cycles as containing large asset price
movements. Prudential bank regulation
can reverse the procyclical effect that
banks have on these price movements.
He suggested that banks be required to
pre-provision for loan losses over the
course of the cycle and capital adequacy
requirements be conditioned on the
rate of growth of bank lending. Jeffrey
Carmichael and Neil Esho, Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority, used
the lessons of Australia’s experience with
asset price cycles to show that the health
of the banking system affects the likeli-
hood of bubbles leading to financial
crises. They also advocated modifying
bank loan loss provisioning requirements
to reduce procyclicality and stress test-
ing of bank portfolios for risk exposure,
but argued portfolio restrictions and
adjustments in capital requirements were
too blunt and inefficient to use in help-
ing control asset price cycles. The finan-
cial cost of crises is inversely related to
the quality of financial skills and services
in a country, according to Michael
Pomerleano, World Bank. Having more
financial analysts, appraisers, actuaries,
and insolvency professionals available
allows a country’s institutions to better
brace against the effects of the bubble.
Also, having more market-based instru-
ments, such as asset securitization and
secondary loan markets, improves the
recovery from asset bubble crashes.
Conclusion
A number of experts in the final ses-
sion of the conference detailed their
ideas for protecting against the effects of
asset bubbles. Jaime Caruana, Governor
of the Bank of Spain, explained the for-
ward-looking, loan-loss provisioning in-
troduced recently in Spain and admired
by some of the conference participants.
It gives banks a greater incentive to use
better risk-management techniques, and
it is countercyclical. Asset price bubbles
are here to stay, according to Vincent
Reinhart, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, so we had better
get used to them. Attention must be paid
to asset prices, but macroeconomic pol-
icy should be geared toward macroeco-
nomic outcomes. Financial regulators
can help mitigate the negative conse-
quences of bubbles by making their sys-
tems more diversified. Anthony Neoh,
China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion, concluded the final session by
agreeing with Reinhart on the inevita-
bility of asset price bubbles and the need
for effective financial regulatory struc-
tures to soften their effects. Improved
market transparency and reduced moral
hazard from implicit government guar-
antees are necessary to keep financial
markets healthy and protected against
the worst consequences of bubbles.
1 A conference proceedings volume, Asset
Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary,
Regulatory, and International Policies, Bos-
ton: MIT Press, will be available in De-
cember 2002.
2 Robert Schiller, 2000, Irrational Exuberance,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.